A Multi-level Investigation of Information Technology Outsourcing by Aubert, Benoit et al.
University of Pennsylvania
ScholarlyCommons
Business Economics and Public Policy Papers Wharton Faculty Research
9-2012







Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers
Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons
This paper is posted at ScholarlyCommons. http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/136
For more information, please contact repository@pobox.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Aubert, B., Houde, J., Patry, M., & Rivard, S. (2012). A Multi-level Investigation of Information Technology Outsourcing. Journal of
Strategic Information Systems, 21 (3), 233-244. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jsis.2012.04.004
A Multi-level Investigation of Information Technology Outsourcing
Abstract
This study proposes and tests a model of the information technology (IT) outsourcing decision that includes
antecedents of both transaction costs and production costs. Production costs show the most robust influence
on governance. Skills required to execute the activities, interdependence between the activities, and firm-level
characteristics – uncertainty and knowledge intensity – are the main explanatory variables of the decision.
Transaction-level uncertainty is the only transaction cost variable found to influence the decision.
Keywords
outsourcing, theory of the firm, information services, multi-level analysis, production costs, transaction costs
Disciplines
Business | Business Administration, Management, and Operations
This journal article is available at ScholarlyCommons: http://repository.upenn.edu/bepp_papers/136
A multi-level investigation of information technology outsourcingq
Benoit A. Aubert a,⇑, Jean-François Houde b, Michel Patry a, Suzanne Rivard a
aHEC Montreal, 3000 Chemin Côte-Sainte-Catherine, Montréal, Canada H3T 2A7
bWharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1400 Steinberg Hall-Dietrich Hall, 3620 Locust Walk, Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 19 May 2011
Accepted 18 April 2012
Available online 12 June 2012
Keywords:
Outsourcing





a b s t r a c t
This study proposes and tests a model of the information technology (IT) outsourcing deci-
sion that includes antecedents of both transaction costs and production costs. Production
costs show the most robust inﬂuence on governance. Skills required to execute the activ-
ities, interdependence between the activities, and ﬁrm-level characteristics – uncertainty
and knowledge intensity – are the main explanatory variables of the decision. Transac-
tion-level uncertainty is the only transaction cost variable found to inﬂuence the decision.
 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Deciding whether an activity should be conducted within the ﬁrm or contracted out is an ongoing concern for both re-
search and practice, including in the information systems (IS) ﬁeld (Lacity et al., 2010). Transaction cost theory (TCT) has
been inﬂuential in explaining this decision in many domains. Under TCT, the choice of the governance structure depends
on two sets of costs: transaction costs (searching for suppliers, negotiating contracts, monitoring and evaluating perfor-
mance) and production costs, the sum of which ﬁrms aim to minimize (Williamson, 1985).
Interestingly, while TCT explicitly mentions both transaction costs and production costs, the vast majority of TCT-based
studies focus on transaction costs and transaction-level variables (Geyskens et al., 2006) and omit production costs. In the IS
ﬁeld, an exception of note in terms of costs is Ang and Straub (1998) who found that supplier production cost advantage led
to a greater degree of IT outsourcing and that transaction costs were negatively related to the degree of outsourcing. In terms
of variable level, Loebbecke and Huyskens (2006) examined the role of ﬁrm-level variables and found that capability-related
elements (relevance of applications and vulnerability associated with capabilities) had signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the outsourc-
ing decision.
The literature on the boundary of the ﬁrm suggests that production costs can be accounted for in explanations of out-
sourcing decisions along three perspectives: economies of scale, coordination of interdependent activities, and capabilities
(Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Economies of scale provide an unsatisfactory explanation (Langlois and Robertson, 1995). In
IS, Lacity and Willcocks (1998) showed that economies of scale did not explain outsourcing decisions: comparable percent-
ages of large and small datacenters achieved cost savings through outsourcing, and when they selected insourcing, small and
large datacenters were able to reach cost saving targets.
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The need to coordinate interdependent activities leads ﬁrms to keep these activities under their control. If activities are
independent, outsourcing one of them does not create coordination problems and does not affect the efﬁciency of the other
activities (Langlois and Robertson, 1995). Outsourcing an interdependent activity would create such problems and would
limit the ﬁrm’s innovative capacity, because it would not control all the interdependent components (Langlois and
Robertson, 1992). In IS, Bahli and Rivard (2005) are among the few who refer to task interdependence as a risk factor in
an outsourcing decision. They suggest that outsourcing activities that are interdependent with other activities entails
coordination problems, misalignments, and higher production costs.
The capabilities perspective suggests that organizations retain the activities for which they have superior capabilities,
ensuring efﬁcient production (Espino-Rodríguez and Padrón-Robaina, 2006). Alternately, ﬁrms outsource those activities
for which they lack capabilities. This corresponds to two IT outsourcing motivations identiﬁed by Lacity et al. (2010): focus
on core capabilities and access to expertise. Capability analysis involves both transaction-level variables, – e.g., the skills
required to perform an activity (Poppo and Zenger, 1998) – and ﬁrm-level variables, – e.g. capabilities that ﬁrms develop
to compete in their industry (Loebbecke and Huyskens, 2006).
This study aims at advancing current knowledge on the antecedents of IT outsourcing decisions by proposing and testing
a model that includes antecedents of both transaction costs and production costs. With respect to transaction costs, the
model retains two key transaction-level characteristics: uncertainty and asset speciﬁcity. With respect to production costs,
it includes transaction-level characteristics – transaction-level capabilities and interdependence among activities – and ﬁrm-
level characteristics – uncertainty and knowledge intensity. The study also aims to reﬁne our understanding of IT outsourc-
ing by analyzing decisions about several IT activities, rather than about a portfolio of activities. This approach addresses an
issue raised by Dibbern et al. (2004) who mentioned that by looking at IT activities as a group, researchers were overlooking
the issue of interdependence between activities. This study expands this line of research by analysing simultaneously several
activities inside each ﬁrm, thus measuring transaction-level elements and enabling an assessment of interdependence, and
by analyzing ﬁrm-level elements, thus providing a multi-level analysis of the outsourcing decision.
The study does not attempt to assess which perspective provides the best explanation, or which level of analysis offers
more explanatory power. Instead, it contributes to knowledge by providing a richer analysis that includes both production
and transaction costs, and both transaction and ﬁrm level perspectives. In doing so, the study espouses Garrouste and Saus-
sier’s (2005) view that the establishment of a theory of the ﬁrm depends on the integration of its various components. It is a
step toward a dialog between different theories (Madhok, 2002) and between IS and its reference disciplines, the former
informing the latter (Lacity et al., 2010).
2. Theoretical development
The following paragraphs introduce the key variables inﬂuencing transaction costs and those inﬂuencing production
costs, and derive research hypotheses.
2.1. Transaction costs
Exchanges between client and supplier entail transactions costs. When they become too high, the ﬁrm might decide to
internalize the activity. Three transaction characteristics explain the magnitude of transaction costs: asset speciﬁcity, uncer-
tainty, and frequency (Williamson, 1985).
Asset speciﬁcity is the difference between the value of an asset in its ﬁrst best use and its value for an alternative usage
(Pisano, 1990). It creates a lock-in problem where one party can be held hostage and asked an unfair price. Contracting for
activities requiring speciﬁc assets is more costly than contracting for generic activities. This leads organizations to manage
these activities in-house. The role of asset speciﬁcity has been supported in many sectors: auto parts (Monteverde and Teece,
1982), aerospace (Masten, 1984), and aluminum (Hennart, 1988). However, asset speciﬁcity was not found to lead to inte-
gration in the semiconductor industry (Leiblein and Miller, 2003). In IS, the results are mixed (Lacity et al., 2010). For exam-
ple, in the presence of speciﬁc assets, Poppo and Zenger (1998) found that ﬁrms kept activities in-house and Barthelemy and
Geyer (2005) observed that ﬁrms used subsidiaries instead of relying on outsourcing. However, Nam et al. (1996) obtained
conﬂicting results. Using three different measures of speciﬁcity, they obtained signiﬁcant results solely for the implicit
knowledge associated with the transaction. Similarly, Lacity andWillcocks (1995) and Loebbecke and Huyskens (2006) could
not ﬁnd support for the role of asset speciﬁcity in the outsourcing decision. Aubert et al. (2004) found asset speciﬁcity to be
positively linked to outsourcing, contradicting the prediction from TCT. Assessing TCT-based studies explaining IT outsourc-
ing decisions, Karimi–Alaghehband et al. (2011) found support for the role of asset speciﬁcity in only 40% of 23 studies. It is
suggested here that these mixed results could be due to the fact that earlier studies took into account only a transaction cost
perspective, at only one level, that of the transaction. Not accounting for production costs and/or ﬁrm-level differences could
explain the mixed ﬁndings. Therefore, this study will test the basic transaction cost hypothesis, in terms of the role of asset
speciﬁcity.
H1. Asset speciﬁcity will be negatively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
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ThesecondTCT transaction characteristic is uncertainty,which refers to lackof information. Themoreuncertainty surrounds
a transaction, themoredifﬁcult it becomes todevise, negotiate, andenforce a contract. If it becomes toodifﬁcult, theactivitywill
be kept in-house (Williamson, 1985). An activity is a set of related tasks,whichproduce oneor several outputs, at a given quality
level. This suggests that assessing the uncertainty surrounding an activity should take into account three related dimensions:
lackof standardization (pertaining to thenature of the tasks), complexity (referring to thedifﬁculty of determining the expected
outputs), and measurement problems (pertaining to the assessment of the quality of the outputs of the activity).
Lack of standardization implies that activities cannot easily be described in detailed guidelines, which renders their gov-
ernance more difﬁcult (Van de Ven and Ferry, 1980). Complex activities lead to multiple possible outcomes and make pre-
diction difﬁcult (Krickx, 2000), which increases the cost to devise a contract. Therefore, complex activities are likely to lead to
higher transaction costs than simple ones and are more likely to be kept in-house. Finally, even if activities could be de-
scribed, measurement problems might prevent the parties to assess the performance achieved. For an activity to be outsour-
ced, parties have to be able to measure it (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972).
Krickx (2000) found that only one form of uncertainty (measurement problems) consistently matched TCT predictions. In
IS, Lacity et al. (2010) found that uncertainty (excluding measurement) had led to consistent results. However, ﬁndings with
regard to measurement problems were mixed. Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated:
H2. Complexity will be negatively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
H3. Standardization will be positively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
H4. Measurement problems will be negatively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
The last TCT transaction characteristic is frequency. Firms will avoid integrating activities they are not executing regularly
(Williamson, 1985). They will outsource these activities even in the presence of asset speciﬁcity or uncertainty. Our study
focuses on the management of IT operations, IT operations, and maintenance activities. These activities are executed contin-
uously (meaning that frequency is inﬁnite). Therefore, transaction-level frequency is not assessed. However, the notion of
demand uncertainty discussed in the ﬁrm-level section parallels in some aspects the notion of frequency.
2.2. Production costs
Production costs are inﬂuenced by both transaction-level characteristics and ﬁrm-level characteristics.
2.2.1. Transaction-level characteristics
Extant research suggests that two key transaction-level characteristics inﬂuence production costs: transaction-level capa-
bilities and interdependence of activities.
The capabilities nurtured inside the ﬁrm to conduct its activities and the notion of core competency provide several in-
sights linked to production costs. The limited resources that a ﬁrm can develop and nurture are important investments and
should be used for core activities (Barney, 1991). Resources are valuable when they allow ﬁrms to perform speciﬁc activities.
Sheehan and Foss (2007) suggest that looking at the use of resources at the activity level would increase the potential of
resource-based view (RBV).
The role of core competencies and RBV is supported by several IS studies (Poppo and Zenger, 1998; Slaughter and Ang,
1996; Teng et al., 1995). In order to assess the relationship between activities and the core of an organization, the types
of skills required to perform the activities can be measured. Authors have usually measured one type of skills (e.g., extent
of skill set (Poppo and Zenger (1998); technical skills (Slaughter and Ang, 1996). Skills are not homogenous. Although some
ﬁrms may view technical skills as a core competency and accordingly develop a higher level of technical skills internally,
such skills are not a core competency for most organizations. Therefore, it is anticipated that the client ﬁrm will be better
at maintaining business-domain skills, while vendors will have an advantage at maintaining technical skills, which are closer
to their own core business. This would lead to speciﬁc patterns of outsourcing.
H5. The importance of technical skills associated with an activity will be positively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
H6. The importance of business-related skills associated with an activity will be negatively associated with the extent of out-
sourcing.
Langlois and Robertson (1992) suggest that independent activities (not dependent on other activities for their execution,
with few and easily identiﬁable links with the other activities of the ﬁrm) are more likely to be outsourced than interdepen-
dent – systemic – activities, because they can be executed in a self-contained way. They found support for the role of inter-
dependence in the micro-computer and stereo components and the automotive industries. These results suggest that
interdependent activities will be kept together.
H7. The interdependent character of an activity will be negatively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
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2.2.2. Firm-level characteristics
Organizations tend to keep in-house the resources they use regularly, making full utilization of their resources, and letting
suppliers absorb low probability demand (Carlton, 1979). This argument resembles the TCT frequency argument (William-
son, 1985). However, it is not simply frequent activities that are kept in-house, but activities for which volume is stable.
Firms transfer ﬂuctuating activities to suppliers. Fluctuation in volume makes externalization more attractive, since a ﬁrm
will not want to own excess assets. Leiblein and Miller (2003) found that demand uncertainty increased the reliance on
outsourcing.
H8. Firm-level uncertainty (ﬂuctuation in volume) will be positively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
When assessing IT outsourcing, it is important to consider the proximity of IT activities with the core capabilities of the
ﬁrm. Earl (1996) mentions that companies operating in sectors for which information systems can provide a strategic advan-
tage might ﬁnd themselves at risk of loss of innovative capacity if they do not keep control on IS activities. This would be
detrimental to production cost. In an economy that relies increasingly on knowledge (Godin, 2006), companies that are more
intensive users of information could be more likely to keep their information systems in-house. Firms in knowledge inten-
sive sectors are more likely to be able to use IT strategically than ﬁrms in sectors of low knowledge intensity.
H9. Knowledge intensity of the enterprise will be negatively associated with the extent of outsourcing.
3. Methodology
The model was tested with a survey of 200 Canadian organizations. A questionnaire presented a list of 16 IT activities
from three groups (IT operations, management of IT operations, or IT maintenance). The unit of analysis is thus an activity,
within a group, within a ﬁrm. Each respondent provided information pertaining to each activity.
The relationships between the transaction-level variables and the outsourcing decision are identiﬁed through variations
between activities and across ﬁrms. By observing multiple activities within a ﬁrm, we separate the effect of the transaction-
level variables from ﬁrm-level variables. In addition, the organization of activities might differ for reasons that are unrelated
to the transaction-level or ﬁrm-level variables explicitly measured. This is modeled by incorporating a set of random effects.
3.1. Model development
The governance structure comprises three choices: in-house, with the activity performed using the ﬁrm’s physical assets
and employees; mixed-mode, where the client keeps the ownership of the physical assets with the supplier providing the
service; and outsourcing, with the activity performed by the supplier having authority over both employees and assets.
These modes are ordered with respect to the degree of control delegated to suppliers. Firms use a threshold strategy when
deciding which structure to use. Letting pj denote the beneﬁt of outsourcing activity j, ﬁrms’ decision is described as:
Yj ¼
in-house if pj 6 lj0
mixed-mode if lj0 < pj 6 lj1
outsourced if pj > lj1
8><>:
This reﬂects the trade-off between the beneﬁts of allocating more control to a supplier relative to using a hierarchical struc-
ture and the costs of doing so.
The beneﬁt pij can be written for ﬁrm i 2 {1, . . . , N} and activity ﬁrm j 2 {1, . . . , J}, as a linear function of the variables (Xij):
pij = Xijb + uij.
The variable uij is the threshold for ﬁrm i to outsource activity j. If uij is independently normally distributed across ﬁrms
and activities according to a standard normal distribution, the econometric model would take an ordered probit form. We
depart from this standard assumption by writing uij as the sum of a ﬁrm’s unobserved heterogeneity parameter hi = {-
hi1, . . . , hiG}, and an iid standard normal random variable 2ij: uij ¼ higðjÞ þ eij where g(j) is a function indicating the group of
activities to which j belongs.
The unobserved heterogeneity parameter is allowed to be different across groups of activities within the same ﬁrm. The
correlation between the unobserved beneﬁt parameters is estimated jointly with the other parameters. We assume that the
vector h is normally distributed across ﬁrms with mean zero and covariance matrix X. It is an ordered probit model with
multiple random effects (Hedeker and Gibbons, 1994).
The probability of choosing each governance structure for activity j, conditional on the ﬁrm’s unobserved heterogeneity,
is:
PrðYij ¼ in-housejh;l;b;XÞ ¼ Uðlj0  ½hgðjÞ þ XijbÞ
PrðYij ¼ mixed-modejh;l; b;XÞ ¼ Uðlj1  ½hgðjÞ þ XijbÞ Uðlj0  ½hgðjÞ þ XijbÞ
PrðYij ¼ outsourcingjh;l;b;XÞ ¼ 1Uðlj1  ½hgðjÞ þ XijbÞ
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where the threshold parameters {l1, . . . , lj} are allowed to vary across activities.







½PrðYij ¼ kjhdijk where dijk ¼
1 if Yij ¼ k;
0 if Yij–k:

The likelihood of Yi in the population, unconditional on ﬁrm’s unobserved heterogeneity, is obtained by integrating out h





where g(h) is the density function of multivariate normal random variables with mean zero and covariance matrix O. The





Since the cost of computing the integral increases exponentially in the dimension of the h, we restrict the number of
groups to be less or equal to 3, and the thresholds l to be constant within each group. The multi-dimensional integral is
approximated using an adaptative-quadrature method (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2005).1
Finally, the posterior-mean of the random effects, denoted by h^j can be computed (Rabe-Hesketh et al., 2004). Two steps
are taken in order to avoid bias estimates. First, model parameters (l, b, O) are estimated and the posterior mean of the ran-
dom effects rationalizing the observed choices are recovered. Then, the correlation between h^j and a vector of ﬁrm-level
covariates Zj is observed by estimating a simple Probit model predicting the probability that the ﬁrm is incline to choose
outsourcing. The following conditional probability model is estimated:
Prðh^j > 0jZjÞ ¼ UðZjcÞ
3.2. Variable deﬁnition and construction
3.2.1. Governance structure
As discussed previously, governance structure (Y) is an ordered variable, taking a value of 1 when the activity is per-
formed in-house, 2 for mixed-governance and 3 for total outsourcing.
3.2.2. Transaction-level variables
The transaction-level variables comprise asset speciﬁcity, measurement problems, standardization, complexity, technical
skills, and business-related skills. It was essential to measure the transaction-level characteristics of each of the 16 activities
composing IT services. Using multiple-items instruments to measure six characteristics for each of the 16 activities would
have deterred potential respondents. To alleviate this, we drew from extant validated multi-item measures to construct suc-
cinct and clear conceptual deﬁnitions of each construct. Respondents were asked to assess on a scale from 1 to 7 each of the
16 activities with respect to each of the six conceptual deﬁnitions, which were presented to three experts who commented
on how each encapsulated its operationalized version. The deﬁnitions were also presented to IS managers to ensure that they
were well understood. Finally a separate survey was conducted to assess multi-item measures along with the deﬁnitions to
determine whether the deﬁnitions represented the concepts adequately. The multi-item measures used were: complexity
(Aubert et al., 1996), asset speciﬁcity (Bahli and Rivard, 2005), business-related skills (Fink and Neumann, 2009, technical
skills (Tippins and Sohi, 2003), and measurement problems and standardization (Wullenweber et al., 2008). Sixty IS manag-
ers completed this separate survey. The deﬁnitions showed the same characteristics as the items in the corresponding multi-
item variable. If the deﬁnitions had been included in the corresponding multi-item measure, they would all have been re-
tained as reliable items.
Following the recommendations of the managers who reviewed the survey, the activities were grouped under manage-
ment, operations, and maintenance. The interdependence among the three groups was measured indirectly through the use
of random effects speciﬁc to group of activities.
3.2.3. Firm-level variables
Firm-level uncertainty was estimated following Levy (1985). The volatility of the industry demand was measured for each
ﬁrm: the monthly GDP of 73 economic sectors, from 1987 to 1999, was used. An auto-regressive model with 12 lags and the
appropriate deterministic effects (monthly dummies (D) and linear trend T) was estimated separately for each industry
j = 1, . . . , 73. Data were obtained from Statistics Canada.
1 The estimation is performed in STATA using the GLAAMM package developed by Rabe-Hesketh et al. (2004).
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From this model, two variables were constructed to evaluate the ability of ﬁrms to anticipate demand volatility. The ﬁrst is
the U-Theil statistic associated with the quality of the GDP forecast using the auto-regressive model:
Uj ¼
PM
m¼2 logGDPjTþm  log dGDPjTþmPM
m¼2 logGDPJTþm  logGDPjTþm1
" #2
The U-Theil statistic is interpreted as the ability of the auto-regressive model to forecast industry demand (i.e. log dGDPjTþm ),
relative to the forecast of the naive mode: log dGDPjTþm ¼ logGDPjTþm1 An increase in this variable implies an increase in the
unexpected volatility of the industry, since an increase Uj is associated with weaker predictions.
The other variable is the absolute value of the trend coefﬁcient dj. It measures the ability of ﬁrms to anticipate the vol-
atility of their industry. An increase in this variable is associated with a decrease in the degree of uncertainty faced by ﬁrms
in the sector, since demand changes are more easily anticipated.
The knowledge-based concentration index (KB) classiﬁes 55 Canadian industrial sectors in three categories (high, med-
ium, and low KB-intensity), with respect to the amount of knowledge embedded in ﬁrms in these sectors (Lee and Has,
1996). The index uses three indicators of knowledge intensity: the share of R&D expenses and two measures of the propor-
tion of high-skilled workers in the work-force.
3.2.4. Control variables
Three control variables were used: size, organization type, and individual thresholds. The relative size is measured by to-
tal sales divided by the median of the industry. A ratio of x% indicates that the sales of the ﬁrm are x% larger than the median
of its sector. This controls for possible economies of scale (even if the literature does not support this effect Lacity and Will-
cocks, 1998).
Dummy variables were introduced for organization type. For similar levels of sales, private companies tend to use more
labor than publicly-traded ones (Trostel and Nichols, 1982) which suggests lower pressure for efﬁciency. Government-
owned corporations, which may be less driven by efforts to reduce production costs and more by political considerations,
might have less incentive to outsource for cost efﬁciency motives (Gantman, 2011).
Finally, different ﬁrms may have different thresholds for outsourcing (Monteverde and Teece, 1982). This was controlled
using individual thresholds in the model.
3.3. Survey procedure
The questionnaire was mailed (without prior contact) to 1496 IT senior managers. Two hundred questionnaires were
completed, for a response rate of 13.3%. This is comparable to rates reported in the literature (Barthelemy and Quelin,
2006: 11%, Poppo and Zenger, 1998: 6%). Respondents belonged to a variety of industries, representing the Canadian indus-
trial composition.
Each respondent provided information on 16 IT activities. Four questionnaires were dropped because of rates of missing
responses over 30%. The ﬁnal sample includes 3011 observations over 196 different ﬁrms. The average number of valid
observations per ﬁrm is 15.36. The data show that the governance modes are not uniformly distributed across ﬁrms or across
types of activities. This difference observed in the outsourcing patterns highlights the importance of incorporating ﬁrm-level
random effects which differ between groups of activities. Appendix A presents descriptive statistics.
4. Results
Table 1 presents the results. Each column represents a different speciﬁcation: no random effect, one ﬁrm-level random
effect, and three random effects speciﬁc to each activity group/ﬁrm. Each speciﬁcation has heterogeneous thresholds be-
tween activity groups. The last two columns separate the maintenance activities from the management and operation
activities.
Variables related to transaction costs offer mixed results. Complexity has a signiﬁcant effect in the basic model and when
group-speciﬁc random effects are included. It is not signiﬁcant when ﬁrm-level random effects are included. The fact that it
remains signiﬁcant with group-speciﬁc random effects suggests that the activities outsourced tend to be simpler than the
ones kept in-house.
Measurability of supplier’s performance has a signiﬁcant effect in the ﬁrst two speciﬁcations, but it is not signiﬁcant when
group-speciﬁc random effects are introduced. This suggests that the capacity to measure the activities is strongly associated
with the group to which the activities belong. Finally, the effects of standardization and asset speciﬁcity are not statistically
signiﬁcant different from zero.
Measures related to production costs show better explanatory power. Firms are more likely to delegate authority to sup-
pliers if the degree of technical skills required is high, and less likely to do so if the degree of business-related skills is high.
These two effects are very robust across speciﬁcations and large in magnitude.
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The results suggest that a portion of the variation between ﬁrms is explained by ﬁrm-level unobserved characteristics,
and that these factors are different between groups of activities. This provides support for the interdependence between
activities of a given group. Organizations keep together activities that belong to the same group. This can be observed by
comparing the log-likelihood statistics across speciﬁcations: the inclusion of the three random effects is statistically
signiﬁcant.
Table 2 shows that the variance of the random effects is the largest for management activities, and the smallest for main-
tenance (r11 > r22 > r33). This indicates that ﬁrm speciﬁc variables explain a higher proportion of the variance for outsourc-
ing decisions of management activities than for the outsourcing decisions of other activities, and a higher proportion of the
variance for decisions related to operations than decisions related to maintenance. The correlation between the random ef-
fects of the ﬁrst two groups is large, indicating that similar factors are affecting the decision to outsource management and
operation activities. This correlation is smaller for the third, suggesting that the factors inﬂuencing the decision to outsource
maintenance are different from the ones inﬂuencing management and operation activities.
The similarity in the outsourcing decision between management and operation activities is also reﬂected in the estima-
tion of the thresholds in the various speciﬁcations. These thresholds are not signiﬁcantly different between operation and
management activities. However, thresholds are systematically signiﬁcant between operation and maintenance activities,
indicating that ﬁrms are more inclined to outsource maintenance activities.
Since maintenance activities present a signiﬁcantly different outsourcing pattern than management and operation activ-
ities, a model separating these two groups is estimated (last column of Table 1). It shows that two TCT variables (complexity
and measurement) and the production cost variables (at the transaction level) are signiﬁcant and in the expected direction
for maintenance activities. For management and operations, only the technical and business-related skills, which are asso-
ciated with production cost considerations, showed signiﬁcant relationships with the decision to outsource. Transaction-cost
variables are not signiﬁcant.
Firm-level results are presented in Table 3. As expected, knowledge intensiveness was associated with lower extent of
outsourcing. Firm-level uncertainty was positively related to outsourcing. Firms in sectors which are following a stable trend
(downward or upward) are less likely to outsource their IT services, as shown by the negative coefﬁcient in Table 3. Similarly,
ﬁrms operating in sectors where aggregate demand is difﬁcult to anticipate (as measured by the U-Theil statistic in Table 3)
Table 1
Results.









Technical skills (7 = High) 0.1272 (6.44) 0.1009 (3.62) 0.1189 (3.59) 0.1093 (2.32) 0.1174 (2.49)
Business-related skills
(7 = High)
0.05554 (3.99) 0.1222 (5.73) 0.1656 (6.42) 0.1732 (4.60) 0.1666 (4.80)
Standardization (7 = Low) 0.01558 (0.94) 0.03036 (1.28) 0.01413 (0.50) 0.05709 (1.29) 0.05473 (1.48)
Measurement (7 = Low) 0.06468 (3.82) 0.04957 (2.06) 0.03495 (1.21) 0.0401 (0.91) 0.09462 (2.48)
Complexity (7 = Low) 0.03401 (1.95) 0.0145 (0.60) 0.06341 (2.30) 0.0657 (1.52) 0.1446 (4.01)
Speciﬁcity (7 = Low) 0.00571 (0.42) 0.007246 (0.35) 0.009267 (0.37) 0.02681 (0.76) 0.01386 (0.41)
Thresholds 1
Group 2 (Operation) 0.04377 (0.63) 0.06322 (0.72) 0.3899 (1.28) 0.3596 (1.18)
Group 3 (Maintenance) 1.06 (15.0) 1.505 (16.50) 2.537 (7.56) 1.886 (2.75)
Constant 1.218 (6.71) 1.224 (4.44) 2.389 (5.15) 1.86 (3.20)
Thresholds 2
Group 2 (Operation) 0.05212 (0.67) 0.07377 (0.72) 0.5138 (1.48) 0.4865 (1.40)
Group 3 (Maintenance) 0.458 (6.00) 0.7759 (7.70) 2.031 (5.53) 1.364 (1.93)
Constant 1.51 (8.22) 1.736 (6.21) 3.19 (6.52) 2.669 (4.42)
Log-likelihood 2377.0726 1920.6298 1815.0182 1802.7886
No. ﬁrms 196 196 196 196
No. observations 3011 3011 3011 3011
T-statistics are in parenthesis (absolute value). Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are in bold.
Table 2
Estimated covariance matrix between random effects.
Group 1 Group 2 Group 3
Group 1: Management of IS 6.384 (1.74) 0.903 0.5913
Group 2: Operation of IS 4.408 (0.90) 3.732 (0.37) 0.6347
Group 3: Maintenance of IS 1.755 (0.78) 1.44 (0.27) 1.38 (0.22)
Standard-errors are in parenthesis. The lower diagonal is the estimated covariance between random effects. The upper diagonal (italic) is the corresponding
estimated correlations.
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are more likely to outsource their IT services. Government-owned organizations use signiﬁcantly less outsourcing than oth-
ers. No signiﬁcant difference was observed between publicly traded and non-traded companies. Size effect is weak and only
signiﬁcant in speciﬁcation 1.
5. Discussion
The results show a split picture. Maintenance activities are inﬂuenced by both transaction cost and production cost con-
siderations. Management and operations are solely inﬂuenced by production cost elements, both at the transaction and the
ﬁrm levels.
Transaction cost hypotheses
H1: Asset speciﬁcity () Not supported
H2: Complexity () Supported for maintenance activities
H3: Standardization (+) Not supported
H4: Measurement problems () Supported for maintenance activities
Production cost hypotheses
H5: Technical skills (+) Supported
H6: business-related skills () Supported
H7: interdependence of the activities () Supported
H8: Demand uncertainty (ﬁrm-level) (+) Supported
H9: Knowledge Intensity () Supported
5.2. Transaction-level
In the results, transaction costs solely depended on uncertainty. It shows the need to adequately match the measure of
uncertainty with the facet of theory we are referring to. Measurement problems and complexity were signiﬁcant in two of
the three speciﬁcations, and both were signiﬁcant for maintenance activities. These results support the TCT argument sug-
gesting that writing and enforcing contracts is more difﬁcult in situations of transactional uncertainty.
Asset speciﬁcity has no signiﬁcant effect on the extent of outsourcing. It questions the emphasis TCT has put on asset
speciﬁcity and the use of TCT in the IT outsourcing literature. In conﬁrms the lack of support described in Lacity et al.
(2011). Studies ﬁnding support for asset speciﬁcity were mostly looking at traditional industries. Maybe the effect of asset
speciﬁcity can only be observed for extreme cases, where the investments are very large and durable. In IT services, such
effect could not be found.
The variables showing the most consistent results at the transaction level, signiﬁcant and in the direction expected, are
related to the core competency argument and inﬂuence production costs rather than transaction costs. By splitting the skills
into two types, current results build on Poppo and Zenger (1998) and increase the understanding of the role of skills and
competencies in the outsourcing decision. It is not merely the intensity of the skills required to perform an activity that inﬂu-
ences the decision; the type of skills is key.
5.3. Firm-level analysis
At the ﬁrm level, many conclusions can be drawn about production costs. As observed by Leiblein and Miller (2003), ﬁrms
appear to keep in-house assets they can use continuously and rely more on suppliers when they can transfer them the bur-
den of variable production. Firms operating in highly volatile environments tend to outsource the provision of their IT ser-
vices instead of making important investments that would not be used continuously. This provides a different reading of the
idea behind the frequency argument offered by Williamson (1985).
Table 3
Probit estimates – posterior mean of the ﬁrm-level random effect.
Speciﬁcation 1: Trend (ability to predict) Speciﬁcation 2: U-Theil (unexpected volatility)
Volatility 0.8426 (2.04) 0.4922 (1.79)
High-knowledge industry 0.5083 (2.17) 0.7216 (3.03)
Public traded corp. 0.1042 (0.52) 0.1453 (0.73)
Crown corp. 1.003 (2.28) 0.9005 (2.05)
Size (relative sales) 0.0146 (1.91) 0.0107 (1.54)
Constant 0.112 (0.71) 0.3583 (1.67)
Log-likelihood 121.5186 122.7705
No. ﬁrms 196 196
T-statistics are in parenthesis (absolute value). Signiﬁcant coefﬁcients are in bold.
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It should be noted that organizations operating in high-knowledge industries were not relying on outsourcing as much as
those in low-knowledge industries. This is especially interesting in the context of IT outsourcing. This suggests that IT plays a
more important role in the production function of these organizations.
5.4. Multi-level analysis
Results show that different sets of activities are inﬂuenced by different sets of variables. Operations and management
were inﬂuenced by variables associated with production costs: ﬁrm-level variables and the types of skills. Maintenance
activities were inﬂuenced by both transaction cost and production cost variables. Each level of analysis provides comple-
mentary information on the outsourcing choices.
When introducing ﬁrm random effects, we note that while they have a signiﬁcant effect on the outsourcing decision, most
of the transaction-level variables that were signiﬁcant in the speciﬁcation without random effects are still signiﬁcant. This
strengthens the conﬁdence in the inﬂuence of these variables. It suggests that while different ﬁrms have different attitudes
or thresholds with respect to outsourcing, they seem to be inﬂuenced by the same decision variables. It also suggests that
transaction-level characteristics are independent of ﬁrm characteristics.
Another interesting element is the effect of interdependence. The signiﬁcant group-ﬁrm random effects suggest that
groups of activities are managed as ensembles. There are two possible explanations. First, each activity in a given group
is inﬂuenced by the same (unobserved) factors when governance mode decisions are made. Second, the activities are, within
each group, co-dependent. Keeping them together reduces production costs. This supports the role of interdependence.
Interestingly, operations and management of operations effects are highly correlated. Their correlation with the mainte-
nance group is lower (Table 2). This suggests that outsourcing decisions on maintenance activities might be rely on a slightly
different logic than decisions about operations and management.
As Table 1 shows, technical and business-related skills have a signiﬁcant effect for all groups of activities. Measurement
problems and complexity signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the outsourcing of maintenance activities only. In other words, operations
andmanagement are inﬂuencedbyantecedents of productioncosts: ﬁrmcharacteristics andRBVvariables.Maintenance activ-
ities are also inﬂuencedby these variables (in similarmagnitude), andbyTCTvariables (measurement andcomplexity). It raises
a question: why are maintenance activities inﬂuenced by TCT considerations, while management and operations are not?
It might be because maintenance activities are further away from the organization’s everyday activities. Therefore, orga-
nizational level inﬂuence on production costs might not be as strong for maintenance as it is for management and operations
(suggested by Table 2). Management and operations activities seem more inﬂuenced by ﬁrm speciﬁc effects, which can limit
the effect of transactional characteristics.
These elements could be seen as different sources of inﬂuence having different pull-strength on the decision depending
on factors analogous to proximity. When activities are closer to the daily conduct of the ﬁrm, production cost considerations
explain in larger part the decision taken. When activities are more remote from the activities of the organization, TCT ele-
ments become inﬂuential.
This might be understood by examining the premises of the various theoretical explanations. In TCT, activities are ex-
pected to be managed similarly from one organization to another. In contrast, in the RBV, heterogeneity is posited and each
decision depends on the characteristics of the activities in relation with the ﬁrm resources. One possibility that might explain
why complexity and measurability are signiﬁcant for maintenance activities would be that the resources required to perform
these activities are less heterogeneously distributed than the activities required for management and operations.
6. Conclusion
This paper presents a model explaining the IT outsourcing decision. It considers both transaction costs and production
costs, and includes a multi-level analysis. The results suggest that the governance structure of an activity is inﬂuenced by
transaction-level and ﬁrm-level variables simultaneously, and that the inﬂuence of each variable depends on the type of
activities. Governance of the activities that are closer to the ﬁrm’s core (management and operations) was driven by vari-
ables inﬂuencing production costs. Transaction costs did not inﬂuence these activities. However, transaction costs inﬂuenced
maintenance activities, which are less affected by ﬁrm-level considerations.
On a theoretical level, the results offer a plausible explanation for apparently conﬂicting past results. Some studies found
that uncertainty decreased the use of outsourcing while others found that it increased it. Results suggest that transaction-
level uncertainty (like measurement problems and complexity) might reduce the use of outsourcing for some activities while
ﬁrm-level uncertainty increases the reliance on external suppliers.
Some ﬁndings highlight unique characteristics of IT outsourcing. For instance, ﬁrms in knowledge intensive industries
using less outsourcing than ﬁrms in less knowledge intensive ones suggests that information processing activities might
be treated somewhat differently from other activities.
Overall results underline the importance to take into account simultaneously variables inﬂuencing transaction costs and
production costs, the latter including variables at the transactional-level and the ﬁrm-level. Future research will beneﬁt from
taking into account multiple levels in order to further develop a comprehensive theory of the ﬁrm.
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In addition, results show that the activities are not totally independent. Any outsourcing decision has to take into account
activities within an ensemble. Managing these activities without acknowledging this would lead to coordination problems
and inefﬁciencies. This might explain why some activities that seem perfect candidates for outsourcing are actually better
managed inside the ﬁrm.
Finally, the results suggest practitioners to consider their unique situation (notably the demand uncertainty and the
knowledge intensity of the domain in which their ﬁrm operates). Recipes that have worked in one organization might not
work in the other. Managers have to be aware of these inﬂuences that are independent from the activities themselves.
Acknowledgment
This research was supported by the Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada.




Scheduling of operations 86.2 4.1 9.7
Control of operations 86.7 4.1 9.2
Production support services 68.4 14.8 16.8
Operations
Operation of applications 83.2 5.6 11.2
Operation of operating system 77 7.7 15.3
CPU operation 77 8.2 14.8
Operation of client/server systems 84.2 7.7 8.2
Operation of telecommunication software 65.3 19.4 15.3
Printer operation 84.2 5.1 10.7
Disk space management 77.6 9.7 12.8
Maintenance
Operating system maintenance 57.7 21.4 20.9
Hardware maintenance 23 43.9 33.2
PC maintenance 36.2 36.2 27.6
Network maintenance 52.6 30.1 17.3
Printer maintenance 23 45.4 31.6
Telecommunication lines maintenance 17.9 39.3 42.9
Firm characteristic.
No. obs. Mean Std. dev. Minimum Maximum
Relative size (sales) 196 8.89 31.7 0.0002462 355.6
Public corporation 196 0.3827 0.486 0 1
Crown corporation 196 0.06633 0.2489 0 1
Volatility (U-Theil) 196 0.661 0.3536 0.128 1.976
Volatility (abs(trend)) 196 0.00257 0.003647 0.000144 1.86
High knowledge-based industry 196 0.2347 0.4248926 0 1
Appendix B. Deﬁnitions
B.1. Skills
For the optimal execution of any activity, different skills are needed. For IS operations, some of these skills are very tech-
nical and involve knowledge of the technology. Others are organizational, and involve knowledge of the information the ﬁrm
is processing or the business in which the ﬁrm is engaged.
<technical skills and business-related skills were evaluated in sequence>
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B.2. Complexity
Complexity is the extent to which the conduct of a given activity is hard to predict, always new, varied, and frequently
subject to change. Complex tasks are also subject to unexpected problems that take time to resolve.
B.3. Standardization
Standardization is the extent to which rules, procedures, and standards exist to guide the conduct of an activity and to
evaluate performance.
B.4. Measurement problems
The measurability of an activity is the extent to which it is easy to evaluate the activity, both in terms of quality and quan-
tity. It is also the extent to which these measures are veriﬁable and unchallengeable.
B.5. Asset speciﬁcity
Asset speciﬁcity is the unique use of the assets required to perform an activity. These assets can be physical or linked to
acquisition of skills or knowledge. Their uniqueness means that they have little or no salvage value outside their use for that
particular activity.
References
Alchian, A., Demsetz, H., 1972. Production, information costs, and economic organization. American Economic Review 62 (2), 777–795.
Ang, S., Straub, D.W., 1998. Production and transaction economies and IS outsourcing: a study of the U.S. banking industry. MIS Quarterly 22 (4), 535–552.
Aubert, B.A., Rivard, S., Patry, M., 1996. Development of measures to assess dimensions of IS operation transactions. Omega 24 (6), 661–680.
Aubert, B.A., Patry, M., Rivard, S., 2004. A transaction cost model of IT outsourcing. Information & Management 41, 921–932.
Bahli, B., Rivard, S., 2005. Validating measures of information technology outsourcing risk factors. Omega 33 (2), 175–187.
Barney, J., 1991. Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage. Journal of Management 17 (1), 99–120.
Barthelemy, J., Geyer, D., 2005. An empirical investigation of IT outsourcing versus quasi-outsourcing in France and Germany. Information & Management
42, 533–542.
Barthélemy, J., Quélin, B.V., 2006. Complexity of outsourcing contracts and ex post transaction costs: an empirical investigation. Journal of Management
Studies 43 (8), 1775–1797.
Carlton, D.W., 1979. Vertical integration in competitive markets under uncertainty. The Journal of Industrial Economics 27 (3), 189–209.
Dibbern, J., Goles, T., Hirschheim, R., Jayatilaka, B., 2004. Information systems outsourcing: a survey and analysis of the literature. Database for Advances in
Information Systems 35 (4), 6–102.
Earl, M.J., 1996. The risks of outsourcing IT. Sloan Management Review (Spring), 26–32.
Espino-Rodríguez, T.F., Padrón-Robaina, V., 2006. A review of outsourcing from the resource-based view of the ﬁrm. International Journal of Management
Reviews 8 (1), 49–70.
Fink, L., Neumann, S., 2009. Exploring the perceived business value of the ﬂexibility enabled by information technology infrastructure. Information &
Management 46 (2), 90–99.
Gantman, S., 2011. IT outsourcing in the public sector: a literature analysis. Journal of Global Information Technology Management 14 (2), 48–83.
Garrouste, P., Saussier, S., 2005. Looking for a theory of the ﬁrm: future challenges. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 58, 178–199.
Geyskens, I., Steenkamp, J.-B., Kumar, N., 2006. Make, buy, or ally: a transaction cost theory meta-analysis. Academy of Management Journal 49 (3), 519–
543.
Godin, B., 2006. The knowledge-based economy: conceptual framework or buzzword? Journal of Technology Transfer 31 (1), 17–30.
Hedeker, D., Gibbons, R., 1994. A random effects ordinal regression model for multilevel analysis. Biometrics 50 (4), 933–944.
Hennart, J.-F., 1988. Upstream vertical integration in the aluminum and tin industries, a comparative study of the choice between market and intraﬁrm
coordination. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 9 (3), 281–299.
Karimi–Alaghehband, F., Rivard, S., Wu, S., Goyette, S., 2011. An assessment of the use of transaction cost theory in information technology outsourcing. The
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 20 (2), 125–138.
Krickx, G., 2000. The relationship between uncertainty and vertical integration. The International Journal of Organizational Analysis 8 (3), 309–329.
Lacity, M.C., Willcocks, L.P., 1995. Interpreting information technology sourcing decisions from a transaction cost perspective: ﬁndings and critique.
Accounting, Management and Information Technology 5 (3/4), 203–244.
Lacity, M.C., Willcocks, L.P., 1998. An empirical investigation of information technology sourcing practices: lessons from experience. MIS Quarterly 22 (3),
363–408.
Lacity, M.C., Khan, S., Yan, A., Willcocks, L.P., 2010. A review of the IT outsourcing empirical literature and future research directions. Journal of Information
Technology 25 (4), 395–433.
Lacity, M.C., Willcocks, L.P., Khan, S., 2011. Beyond transaction cost economics: towards an endogenous theory of information technology outsourcing.
Journal of Strategic Information Systems 20 (2), 139–157.
Langlois, R.N., Robertson, P.L., 1992. Networks and innovation in a modular system: lessons from the microcomputer and stereo component industries.
Research Policy 21, 297–313.
Langlois, R.N., Robertson, P.L., 1995. Firms, Markets, and Economic Change. Routledge, NY, p. 185.
Lee, F.C., Has, H., 1996. A quantitative assessment of high-knowledge vs. low-knowledge industries. In: Howitt, P. (Ed.), The Implications of Knowledge-
Based Growth for Micro-Economic Policies. University of Calgary Press, pp. 39–78.
Leiblein, M., Miller, D., 2003. An empirical examination of transaction- and ﬁrm-level inﬂuences on the vertical boundaries of the ﬁrm. Strategic
Management Journal 24, 839–859.
Levy, D.T., 1985. The transactions cost approach to vertical integration: an empirical examination. Review of Economics and Statistics 67 (3), 438–445.
Loebbecke, C., Huyskens, C., 2006. What drives netsourcing decisions? An empirical analysis. European Journal of Information Systems 15 (4), 415–423.
Madhok, A., 2002. Reassessing the fundamentals and beyond: Ronald Coase, the transaction cost and resource-based theories of the ﬁrm and the
institutional structure of production. Strategic Management Journal 26 (6), 535–550.
Masten, S.E., 1984. The organization of production: evidence from the aerospace industry. Journal of Law and Economics 24 (2), 403–418.
B.A. Aubert et al. / Journal of Strategic Information Systems 21 (2012) 233–244 243
Monteverde, K., Teece, D.J., 1982. Supplier switching costs and vertical integration in the automobile industry. The Bell Journal of Economics 13 (1), 206–
213.
Nam, K., Rajagopalan, S., Rao, A., 1996. A two-level investigation of information systems outsourcing. Communications of the ACM 39 (7), 37–44.
Pisano, G., 1990. The R&D boundaries of the ﬁrm: an empirical analysis. Administration Science Quarterly 35 (1), 153–176.
Poppo, L., Zenger, T., 1998. Testing alternative theories of the ﬁrm: transaction cost, knowledge-based, and measurement explanations for make-or-buy
decisions in information services. Strategic Management Journal 19 (9), 853–877.
Rabe-Hesketh, S., Pickles, A., Skrondal, A., 2004. GLLAMM: A general class of multilevel models and a STATA program. Technical report.
Rabe-Hesketh, S., Skrondal, A., Pickles, A., 2005. Maximum likelihood estimation of limited and discrete dependent variable models with nested random
effects. Journal of Econometrics 128, 301–323.
Sheehan, N.T., Foss, N.J., 2007. Enhancing the prescriptiveness of the resource-based view through porterian activity analysis. Management Decision 45 (3),
450–461.
Slaughter, S., Ang, S., 1996. Employment outsourcing in information systems. Communication of the ACM 39 (7), 47–54.
Teng, J.T., Cheon, J., Grover, V., 1995. Decisions to outsource information systems functions: testing a strategy-theoretic discrepancy model. Decision
Sciences 26 (1), 75–104.
Tippins, M.J., Sohi, R.S., 2003. IT competency and ﬁrm performance. Is organizational learning a missing link? Strategic Management Journal 24 (8), 745–
761.
Trostel, A.O., Nichols, M.L., 1982. Privately-held and publicly-held companies: a comparison of strategic choices and management processes. Academy of
Management Journal 25 (1), 47–62.
Van de Ven, A., Ferry, D.L., 1980. Measuring and Assessing Organizations. Wiley, New York, NY.
Williamson, O., 1985. The Economic Institutions of Capitalism. Free Press, New York, NY.
Wullenweber, K., Beimborn, D., Weitzel, T., Konig, W., 2008. The impact of process standardization on business process outsourcing success. Information
System Frontiers 10 (2), 211–224.
244 B.A. Aubert et al. / Journal of Strategic Information Systems 21 (2012) 233–244
